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STAIEMEN1 Of JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken by respondent/appellant Jennifer Alison ("Ms. Alison") from 
the trial court's Memorandum Decision modifying the divorce decree in favor of the 
Petitioner, Mr. Alban, and entry of Supplemental Decree of Divorce filed on October 4, 
2006 The Utah Appeals Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3. 
SIATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it modified a 
divorce decree without substantial changes ii i cii ci it i istai ices and when the Cc i ir t 
erred in full) considering the Children's best interests while severely reducing 
Respondent's alimony award. 
Standard of Review. The determination to modify a divorce decree is 
generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Okelberry v. W. 
Daniels Land Ass yny 2005 UT App 327, 120 P.3d 34. In deciding whether to 
grant a new trial or remand the case, Appellate court's reverse only for an abuse 
of that discretion. 
Issue No. 2. Whether the Trial Court's order violates Article XIV of the United 
States Constitution and the Utah State Constitition of Equal Protection Under the Law. 
1 
Standard of Review. With regard to the questions about the legal 
adequacy of findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's 
statements concerning issues of law, the Appellate Court reviews for 
correctness. Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 2004 UT App 37, 86 P3d 767 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is an appeal from a modification of a supplemental divorce decree. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW. 
A decree of divorce was entered on April 23, 2004. On December 8, 2004, 
Petitioner filed a petition to modify the divorce decree. A bench trial was held 
on July 17, 2006 to determine whether the divorce decree should be modified. 
On July 20, 2006, the Third District Court issued a Memorandum Decision 
modifying the divorce decree in favor of the Petitioner. A Notice of Entry of 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce was filed on October 4, 2006. Respondent 
filed an appeal on October 24, 2006. After mediation failed, the Parties were 
instructed to file appellate briefs. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent/Appellant accepts the Statement of Facts adopted by the Court in 
its Memorandum Decision and attached to the brief in the Addendum of 
Petitioner's and Respondent's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court's order violates Article XIV of the United States 
Constitution in that it denied Respondent/Appellant equal protection guaranteed 
under the laws of the United States. The District Court abused its discretion in 
finding that there was a substantial change in circumstances warranting a 
modification of the divorce decree. The draconian diminution of alimony from 
$3000 a month to $500 a month in a one year period constituted an abuse of 
discretion because the trial court left the Petitioner free to pursue his love of 
flying in lieu of being responsible for the welfare of his children. Compounding 
these errors the trial court imputed phantom income to Respondent. Stated 
simply, unlike Petitioner, Respondent was not given the luxury nor does she 
have the option with two young children to select the hours of her employment. 
There is no justification for this disparate treatment which appears gender 
based. In addition, the trial court inexplicably gave preferential treatment to 
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Petitioner's desire to fly around the world while Respondent took considerable 
personal sacrifice to care for the children and their best interests. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court erroneously did not address the best interests of the 
children. Instead, it apparently gave preferential treatment to Petitioner (and 
likewise accommodated Delta Airlines) in lieu of requiring both parents to 
share responsibility for their children. Petitioner makes over $150,000 per year 
and was erroneously afforded by the District Court unfettered flexibility to 
work sporadically month to month at Delta's discretion (Transcript at pages 87 
and 88). In contrast, the trial court left Respondent a "Hobson's choice": either 
become gainfully employed as a entry level worker who unlikely could make 
the imputed income of $40,000 per year the trial court imputed without an 
evidentiary basis and still be a full time mother, or work sporadically to meet 
the obligations of her children when Respondent criss-crossed the country to 
earn over $150,000 a year, but will only contribute $500 per month in alimony 
for the 14 years Respondent spent supporting his career and caring for their 
home and children. 
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On a petition for modification of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement 
for relief is a showing of a substantial change of circumstances occurring since 
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself. Moore v. Moore, 
872 P.2d 1054, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). If a change in circumstances is 
reasonably contemplated at the time of divorce, then it is not legally cognizable 
as a substantial change in circumstances in modification proceedings. Dana v. 
Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 729 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In the Memorandum Decision 
modifying the divorce decree, the trial court on page 3 of the memorandum 
agreed with Respondent's Findings of Fact 6-9 where it was explicit that it was 
contemplated Respondent would be seeking a teaching certification. However, 
the teaching certification did not contemplate a reduction of alimony. 
ihc ueciSioii to pursue a career ouisiue leacHing as originally contemplated 
was significantly influenced on Respondent's needs to be with the children 
while Petitioner was flying about the country. (Transcript of Modification 
Hearing, pages 96 and 97). Petitioner admitted so. (Transcript of Modification 
Hearing, pages 87 and 88) It is unequal and gender based treatment under the 
laws of the State of Utah and the United States constitution to allow one former 
spouse total flexibility and arbitrary use of his time as to child care, reduce 
markedly his financial payments to his wife of 17 years, and require her to work 
40 hours a week to make ends meet while being the primary caretaker of the 
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children. The trial court in essence favored the husband's wants over the wife's 
needs; an approach that is inherently unequal treatment under the laws of this 
state and the United States and is not in the best interests of the children. 
In its Memorandum Decision in the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
section, the Court stated the positions of Respondent succinctly. 
"The Court accepted Respondent's testimony that being a teacher would 
maximize her ability to be with the children while still providing a reasonable 
wage. Her abandonment of that plan, while understandable, is found by the 
court to be largely in her own interests more than in the interests of the children 
as she expressed in the trial in January 2004." 
However, the trial court failed to take into account what is good for the 
goose is good for the gander. The Court failed to even mention the latitude the 
Petitioner as pilot had while finding that Petitioner spends only 130 nights a 
year with the children (Finding of Fact, RFF 5, Page 2 of Memorandum 
Decision). Petitioner further requested in his request for reduction of alimony 
that the parent time be modified if Petitioner received a promotion to the rank 
of captain as that would alter his schedule (see Memorandum Decision, Page 27 
Background). This was an abuse of discretion by the trial court and lacked any 
evidentiary basis. 
The trial court, based on the significant modification of alimony, 
never considered whether it would be in the best interests of the children if 
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Petitioner took a job at Home Depot or another place where he could make 
comparative wages of Respondent while contributing equal time to raising their 
children on a regular schedule. Yet the trial court had no equivocations in 
relegating Respondent to the court's preferred profession because as the court 
stated, 
"It would be wonderful if a parent, father or mother, could not work at all 
outside the home and could stay home with children and be available for them 
all day and night. As discussed in January 2004 and as is obvious, in a divorce 
situation that cannot happen here. While respondent desires to be with the 
children, commendably, she still must work and she recognizes that. However, 
changing fields and careers has hardly been a steady advancement toward 
productive employment." 
The above commentary by the court misses the greatness of what 
entrepreneurs have contributed to American society. The lower court 
erroneously imposed its perception of a livelihood upon Respondent, without a 
tactual or legal basis. The Wnglii brothers changed aviation, not the pilots. Bill 
Gates changed computers, even though he left his career path in college. 
Respondent has found a promising career in areas that are outside of teaching 
thereby affording her to be with the children because Petitioner has chosen an 
erratic work schedule. Yet the trial Court has never examined whether 
Petitioner's self-interest in flying and being away from his children are in the 
best interests of the children. It is quite possible that both parents making 
smaller wages but being around equally to raising the children would be in their 
best interests. 
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The trial court further noted on page 5 of the Memorandum Decision, "the 
simple fact is that Respondent will have to work and spend less time with the 
children or more fully accept a lesser standard of living-one or the other." The 
Court never once mentioned that Petitioner should face the same choice. Why is 
there disparate treatment between husband and wife in this case? Both have 
parental obligations. Being a pilot and maintaining a carefree lifestyle may 
have to be sacrificed when two parents have equal responsibilities under the law 
for their children. 
The Court further stated, in a highly prejudicial manner, 
"Without trying to be "Sam the old philosopher" respondent must choose 
between being with the boys as she wants and being able to live in the home 
and community she wants and being able to live in the home and community 
she lives and its attendant expenses, drive a Mercedes, and enjoy the good life 
she currently has. Her income and a amount ihe Court beiieves is fair as 10 
alimony and child support will not allow her to engage in expenses of the type 
she lists and unless she works and earns more than she has been earning. 
(Memorandum Decision, Page 7, Emphasis added). 
Once again, the trial court's findings are not supported by the evidence. For 
example, the Mercedes (which creates a visceral impression of wealth), is a van 
that is approximately 10 years old with 125,000 miles on it and was purchased 
by Petitioner new when he was living the "good life". Its Blue Book \alue is 
approximately $9,000 and its repairs per year are more than its worth. 
Nevertheless, the Court abused its discretion and has singled out the 
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Respondant for wanting to change her mind with respect to a teaching 
profession to a more promising and fulfilling career in other fields. To this end, 
Respondent/Appellant is not seeking any alimony whatsoever if she is afforded 
the same latitude to have a fixed work schedule with each parent alternating 
equal time so they can each pursue their respective careers. It is the best 
interests of the children that should dictate how the children should be cared for 
and the obligation and responsibility of both parents. Marriage takes two, 
procreation takes two, and parenting takes two. If the marriage is dissolved, it 
does not diminish the obligations of two to care for the children. The trial court 
committed reversible error in excusing Petitioner from his parental obligations 
and inexplicably foisting them upon the mother. 
Attorney's Fees 
During the hearing for the modification of the divorce decree commenced by 
Petitioner, Respondent's counsel requested attorney's fees on behalf of 
Respondent (Transcript page 166). The decision to award attorney fees and the 
amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. Kelley 
v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, P30, 9 P.3d 171. However, in awarding attorney 
fees, the trial court must consider the receiving spouse's financial need, the 
payor's spouse ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. The 
trial court erroneously failed to consider Respondent's financial needs, the 
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Petitioner's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. For 
these reasons, this court should remand to the trial court for further review of 
Respondent's request for attorney's fees. 
Conclusion 
The District Court abused its discretion with the law and the facts. It is 
evident that the Court did not weigh the best interests of the children but rather 
tried to mediate money matters between Petitioner and Respondent without 
carefully considering the needs of two children of tender years. 
Respondent/Appellant respectfully requests this Court reinstate alimony to the 
amount before the divorce decree was modified pending remand on issues 
involving allocation of time spent with the children so that both Respondent and 
rctitioner can equally fulfill their vocational pursuits while meeting the best 
interests of the children they both brought into this world. Respondent also 
requests attorney's fees incurred in defending the petition to modify the divorce 
decree and in the appeal. Finally, Petitioner/Appellee needs to either pay up or 
show up for his children. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of August, 2007. 
Donald E/Littl 
Attorney for R^pondent/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of August 2007,1 caused this Brief to be served on 
counsel or parties of record, by United States Mail 
Donald E. Up 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
(435) 901-0333 
Eric R. Alban 
5135 Cove Canyon Drive, #303 
Park City, Utah 84098 
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Addendum 
Contents 
Memorandum Decision 
Respondent and Petitioner's Findings of Fact 
Transcript Excerpts - Pages 87, 88, 96, 97 and 166, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ERIC RICHARD ALBAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JENNIFER ALBAN nka JENNIFER 
ALISON, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 034500023 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: July 20, 2006 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
July 17, 2006. Petitioner was present with Dean C. Andreasen and 
Respondent was present with Ellen Maycock. 
BACKGROUND 
A trial was held in January 2004 and a decree of divorce was 
entered April 23, 2004. The court wrote a memorandum decision 
January 27, 2004, but there were objections and the decree was 
entered as above. 
On December 8, 2004, petitioner filed a petition to modify. 
It alleged there had been a substantial change in circumstances 
in that petitioner, as a Delta pilot, had his salary and benefits 
reduced substantially. He alleged that his base pay rate was 
reduced approximately 33%, and that he would be earning 
approximately $10,000 per month rather than $13,000 per month as 
previously. Further, there were additional deductions petitioner 
un::4i2 
would have to pay. Petitioner asked that the child support be 
reduced, that alimony be reduced, and that the parent time be 
modified if petitioner received a promotion to the rank of 
captain as that would alter his schedule. Petitioner sought fees 
and costs. 
On January 6, 2005, respondent filed a response and counter-
petition. Respondent denied the essential allegations relating 
to economic matters and petitioner prayed for a modification as 
to parent time as the joint legal custody was unworkable. She 
sought sole legal and physical custody and appropriate parent-
time for petitioner. 
On January 10, 2005, petitioner filed a reply to the 
counter-claim. 
On August 19, 2005, petitioner sought temporary relief. The 
motion alleged in January 2005 he was made a captain and went 
down in seniority and sought a parent time coordinator, 
reductions in child support and alimony and reimbursement for 
overpayments. 
The parties agreed on a parent time coordinator and Denise 
Goldsmith was appointed October 14, 2005. The remaining issues 
were reserved for trial. 
A trial date was fixed in March 2006 but stricken by 
agreement of the parties due to another Delta Airlines contract 
issue. 
-2-
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. The court took the matter under 
advisement. The court will incorporate by reference petitioner's 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (PFF) or 
respondent's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
(RFF) where appropriate. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court finds in accord with PFF 1, RFF 1, PFF 2 and 
RFF 2. 
2. The court finds in accord with RFF 3 and 4, but finds the 
children spend 130 nights with petitioner. The court finds in 
accord with RFF 5. That parent time cost is split between the 
parties and that is to continue. That coordinator has worked 
well for both parties and for the children. 
3. The court finds in accord with RFF 6 - 9 and adds that 
the raises in 2 0 07 and 2008 will be 1.5%. The court finds in 
accord with the first sentence of RFF 11. Respondent's testimony 
at the January 2004 trial was highly influential in the court's 
determination to award rehabilitative (or educational) alimony. 
The court accepted respondent's testimony that being a teacher 
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would maximize her ability to be with the children while still 
providing a reasonable wage. Her abandonment of that plan, while 
understandable, is found by the court to be largely in her own 
interest more than in the interests of the children as she 
expressed in the trial in January 2004. While perhaps she can 
make more money in her new chosen field, and while possibly she 
can work from home and "free lance," and thus be available to the 
children, those are all unknown. Her choice to leave the 
teaching possibility is not entirely selfish, but influences the 
court in its decisions about the changed circumstances and the 
need for alimony and the amount thereof. 
4. The court finds in accord with PFF 1 2 - 1 5 . 
5. The court finds in accord with PFF 16(A) -(E), and finds 
that a 1.5% increase in salary will also occur in 2007 and 2008 
and petitioner's seniority will increase each year, making his 
bidding more favorable to him gradually ovpr time. 
6. The court finds in accord with PFF 17, except the court 
finds as above that petitioner's income is $11,500 per month for 
2006. The court finds in accord with PFF 22 and 23, but as noted 
seniority changes as petitioner serves as a captain and his 
flight availability will improve with time. 
7. The court finds petitioner's reasonable expenses are 
currently $4000 per month. 
8. As to respondent, her income is much more troubling. The 
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court commented editorially in the January 2004 memorandum 
decision and the court's feelings have not changed. Somewhat 
factually but mostly editorially, these two boys are now ages 14 
and 10. While the court determined in January 2004 that the 
elder of the sons, Dane, has a disorder called Asperger's 
Syndrome, it was clear the disorder is one that is somewhat 
"mild." (The parties contemplate Dane attending college.) The 
court is not now convinced that these two boys "need" the 
attention respondent desires and feels compelled to give them. 
While that is again highly commendable, that time with the 
children makes it such that respondent is unable to work. It 
would be wonderful if a parent, father or mother, could not work 
at all outside the home and could stay home with the children and 
be available for them all day and night. As discussed in January 
2004 and as is obvious, in a divorce situation that cannot happen 
here. While respondent desires to be with the children, 
commendably, she still must work and she recognizes that. 
However, changing fields and careers has hardly been a steady 
advancement toward productive employment. The simple fact is 
that respondent will have to work and spend less time with the 
children or more fully accept a lesser standard of living-one or 
the other. Respondent cannot expect that petitioner will continue 
to pay for her to stay at home and be with boys who are 10 and 14 
years old, whatever problems the elder of the boys has. The 
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standard of living and spending over $6000 a month on expenses, 
as one without an income, cannot occur, it is just impossible 
when there is another party who is entitled to live a life. The 
court's frustrations are not at respondent's desires, but at her 
inability to understand that those desires to stay home with the 
boys do not require petitioner to entirely pay for her ability to 
do so. She must work if she desires to live a life style even 
close to what was enjoyed previously. 
9. The court finds in accord with PFF 25 and 26 The court 
finds that respondent's income from her part time photography was 
basically a "one time" situation that is at best sporadic and is 
not a viable or consistent source of income at this point. 
10. The court finds in accord with PFF 28, 29 and 30 and RFF 
14. However, the timing of the prospective employment cannot be 
determined with any degree of certainty. Respondent testified 
that it is likely she will not be able to work for RedCastle 
until the current employee at RedCastle leaves in the Fall of 
2007. The court has only that testimony to go on despite the 
argument of petitioner that she could go to work earlier at 
P.edCast le. 
11. Respondent again testified that her expenses were 
approximately $6100 per month. The court again finds and 
concludes that the reasonable expenses are as found at trial, 
$4500 per month. What one spends and what is now available are 
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not always the same. The court again reduces the expenses as 
being unreasonable and unworkable in the areas of cell phones, 
clothing, medical expenses, activities, entertainment, gifts, 
donations, incidentals, photographs, auto expense, pets and 
parent time coordinator fees (petitioner lists $92 per month, 
respondent lists more. Further, while helpful, it appears to the 
court the parties could, if they chose, work these things out and 
eliminate this expense entirely). Without trying to be "Sam the 
old philosopher" respondent must choose between being with the 
boys as much as she wants and being able to live in the home and 
community she lives in with its attendant expenses, drive a 
Mercedes, and enjoy the good life she currently has. Her income 
and an amount the court believes is fair as to alimony and child 
support will not allow her to engage in expenses of the type she 
lists unless she works and earns more than she has been earning. 
12. The court must impute income to respondent but there was 
very little testimony on which to base that imputation. While 
there appears to be job open at some time with RedCastle, 
operated by a friend of respondent, there was no evidence that 
such a job could begin before the end (Fall) of 2007. The court 
does not believe it necessary for respondent to obtain her degree 
before that employment may begin, however. To give some "leeway" 
in that job opening, which depends on another person leaving 
RedCastle, the court imputes income to respondent in the sum of 
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$39,500 year, or $3292 per month, beginning in 2008. Until that 
time the court imputes income to respondent in the sum of $20,000 
per year, or $1666 per month beginning in September, 2006, using 
an approximate wage of $10 per hour. 
13. The court finds that petitioner's reasonable and 
legitimate expenses on an ongoing basis are $4000 per month. 
14. Child support should be calculated using a joint custody 
worksheet using $11,500 for petitioner and $1666 for respondent 
beginning September 2006 until December 2007, and then using 
$3292 per month beginning January 2008 for respondent. 
15. As to alimony, the decree provided that the "base" 
amount of $3000 per month from petitioner to respondent would 
reduce beginning 2007 to $2000 per month. That obviously assumed 
respondent would be working by that time as a teacher based on 
the evidence presented at the January 2004 trial. It now 
appears, because there has been a change, that respondent has not 
made valiant or commendable or even passing efforts to secure 
employment. The court awarded the educational or rehabilitative 
alimony NOT on the assumption that she would spend all of that 
$1500 ner month directly on education. The court acted on the 
common sense notion that while a person is in school, studying 
diligently with a full class load, one cannot work more than part 
time, but when one is not in school, more work can be 
accomplished for more pay. The goal was to have respondent work 
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so the children could be with respondent. Having changed that 
now, again the court finds mostly for her own benefit, respondent 
has now engaged in conduct that amounts to a material and 
substantial change in circumstances. The court had in mind that 
the previous alimony award would allow respondent to still be 
with the children, but that she had to work and work more when 
not in school full time. The testimony in this modification 
trial shows respondent has not really even attempted to work and 
her school efforts have been successful but at less than a rapid 
pace. Respondent's choice to be with the children more than 
working is again fully understandable and even commendable in the 
court's view, but it is a choice which does not require 
petitioner to fund her long educational process. While the court 
has sympathy for and understanding of a working mother going to 
school, and the difficulties that must entail, her college load 
was at most very light as shown by the exhibits. Respondent took 
a total of 22 credit hours in three semesters. That load, in 
spite of having children, allows at least some time for 
employment and earnings and there has been almost no income 
whatever in that time to respondent. More hours have been taken 
in the graphic arts course work, but the semester hours taken 
were 11 and 12 credit hours evidently, leaving again some time 
for work and earnings, and there has been virtually no work or 
income produced by respondent. To the court the alimony awarded 
-9-
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was to allow the parties to be treated equitably and yet require 
each to work for their own support. Petitioner has earned and 
respondent has not earned. That change in circumstance is 
significant as it impacts the entire basis of the rehabilitative 
alimony awarded, for the persuasive reasons given at the January 
2004 trial by respondent reflecting her desire to work in a way 
she could be with the children. Those reasons have now been 
abandoned. 
Thus, the court believes that alimony ought to be and is 
retained at $3000 per month through August 2006, then it is 
reduced to $2000 effective September 2006 through the remainder 
of 2006 and 2007, then it is reduced to $500 per month beginning 
in 2008. Those amounts, coupled with the child support, allow 
petitioner to meet her expenses found to be reasonable at $4500. 
16. The court will not require respondent to repay the 
educational alimony petitioner claims has been "overpaid.". 
However, indirectly respondent is being required to repay some 
as the alimony is being reduced four months earlier than 
previously ordered, and that again is because the alimony awarded 
previously was based on a circumstance, now substantially 
changed, that the court believed respondent would be engaged full 
time as a student seeking a teaching certificate. Respondent has 
not sought that certificate on a full time basis and now has 
abandoned it and that was the basis of the original alimony 
-10-
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award. If she is not- a- full time student she can be working and 
must be working. 
17. To require respondent to literally ''repay" would not be 
equitable. Petitioner has survived well, has added to his 401(k) 
plan significantly, and respondent and the children would 
needlessly suffer if respondent were required to repay more than 
as required herein. Again, as noted, the court did NOT envision 
respondent would spend every dollar of rehabilitative alimony 
directly on education, but did envision that more work would 
produce more income especially during the times when not a full 
time student. That has not happened. Respondent has received, by 
way of this educational alimony, $28,500 and has spent directly 
on education approximately $10,000. As mentioned, it will not be 
equitable nor in the best interests of the children (nor will it 
show petitioner's concern for and love of his children) to order 
a return of even a portion of that sum, other than as is being 
done in the form of reducing the alimony four months earlier than 
previously ordered. 
18. As to medical expenses, the court is baffled by what it 
T7 1 Q T , r C O O C r> m r M . r l o O +" —IITTT/^M^IIS^I K r \ V > - i T T - i / ^ v K T T -f- VI /-> v-> —i -y~ -J- -i /~\ «-<• T 1 V>i /-\ n n n - ^ f 
does not find the evidence compelling that either party owes the 
other party any money for past medical expenses. The request of 
petitioner for reimbursement of some $369 is denied. From this 
time forward, the parties should exert a concentrated effort 
(even a minimal effort should accomplish the task) to simply keep 
track each month of what each spends on medical and other 
expenses for the children. At the beginning of each month 
(surely the parties can agree on a format and date to exchange 
simple information such as copies of checks or paid bills) the 
parties exchange that information and reimburse each other as 
needed. (The court feels like an elementary school teacher 
telling the class how to keep track of their money.) It is not 
difficult to determine what each party pays for medical expenses 
and to equalize those amounts if any effort is put forth to do 
that. 
19. The video duplication is even more challenging to the 
court to figure out the level of maturity involved in this 
"issue." Certainly someone can find the video tapes of the 
children and copy them and give those copies to petitioner and 
petitioner is to pay the cost of that duplication. That is 
ordered to be done within 60 days of this order. 
20. The court finds and concludes that there had been a 
substantial change in circumstances, mainly in the ability of 
r6SnQndGnt to earn. Petitioner's income has also been reduced. 
As discussed, respondent has a college degree but has been a 
homemaker most of the marriage and was not employed outside the 
home. The previous awards were based on the idea that she would 
be a full time student seeking a teaching certificate and thus 
-12-
could work very little, except when not in school. Since that is 
not occurring, she is able to work more and earn more, and that 
is a substantial change in circumstances that justifies this 
petition and these changes. These changes are not that much 
different but given the likely income of respondent with this new 
job, a reduction in alimony is appropriate. 
21. Neither party has been shown that the other party should 
pay their fees. Each party to bear their own fees, which are 
substantially in the same amount. 
Petitioner is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
-13-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 034500023 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
Respondent. 
Petitioner's petition to modify the decree of divorce came before the court for trial on 
July 17, 2006, pursuant to notice. Petitioner was present and represented by his counsel, Dean 
Andreasen. Respondent was present and represented by her counsel, Ellen Maycock. The 
Honorable Bruce Lubeck presided. The court having heard the testimony of witnesses, received 
exhibits, heard arguments of counsel and good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters the 
following: 
ERIC RICHARD ALBAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JENNIFER ALBAN nka JENNIFER 
AT TCnXT 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Decree of Divorce. The decree of divorce in the above-entitled matter was 
entered on April 24, 2004. 
2. Marriage. The parties were married for seventeen years. 
3. Children and Custody. The parties have two children as issue of their marriage, 
Dane Alban, born March 30, 1992, currently age 14, and Dillon Alban, born June 24, 1996, 
currently age 10. The parties were awarded joint legal and physical custody of the children, 
although the court recognized that respondent was the primary caregiver of the children and that 
her residence would be considered the primary residence. 
4. At the time of the divorce and currently, petitioner is employed as a pilot for Delta 
Airlines. Because his schedule varies from month to month, the parent-time arrangements for the 
parties have varied. Petitioner has spent an average of approximately 9 nights per month with the 
children since the entry of the decree of divorce, plus a few extra vacation and holiday 
overnights. Thus, the children have approximately 115 overnights with petitioner each year. 
5. The parties have had difficulties with scheduling parent-time and the children 
sometimes do not wish to spend time with petitioner. They have employed a parenting 
coordinator, Dr. Denise Goldsmith, to assist them with scheduling and other issues concerning 
their children. 
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6. Employment and Income of the Parties. At the time of the divorce, petitioner 
was employed by Delta Airlines as a pilot. The court found that his gross monthly income at the 
time of the divorce was $13,339. 
Petitioner is still employed by Delta Airlines. Since the entry of the divorce decree, Delta 
Airlines has undergone financial difficulties that have resulted in changes in petitioner's income. 
During the same time period, however, petitioner has received promotions. He is now flying as a 
captain operating MD90 equipment. His gross income in 2006 to date is approximately $11,500 
per month. Pursuant to the contract between Delta and its pilots, he will receive raises in January 
of 2007 and January of 2008. It is somewhat difficult to determine the anticipated future income 
for petitioner, both because of the changes in Delta's salary structure for pilots, and the fact that 
petitioner has not yet had an extended period of employment under the new salary structure. 
However, the court believes that $11,500 per month gross income is a fair estimate to use for 
petitioner for the remainder of 2006. Thus, petitioner's gross income is currently approximately 
15% lower than it was at the time of the divorce. 
7. Respondent has a Bachelor's Degree in advertising, but has not worked in the 
field. She is now 43 years old. At the time of the divorce, respondent had had some employment 
outside the home, but for the most part, worked part-time and spent the majority of her time as 
primary earegh er to the children. 
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8. At the time of the entry of the decree, respondent planned to take additional 
college classes to become a teacher. The court found that she should complete her training to 
become a teacher by the end of 2006. 
9. After the entry of the decree, respondent attempted for some time to pursue 
education to obtain a teaching certificate. However, after some experience in that field, she 
realized that the program did not suit her and that her income from that profession would be 
inadequate to meet her future needs. She estimated that it would take her at least four years to 
finish the program to become certified as a teacher. Accordingly, she changed to a graphics arts 
program. She started the two-year program in graphic arts at Salt Lake Community College in 
the fall of 2005. Respondent now is working toward an Associate Degree of Applied Science in 
Visual Art and Design with Multimedia Emphasis. 
10. Although petitioner is willing to provide care for the children, he cannot predict 
when he will be able to do so. Thus, respondent cannot plan her schedule relying on petitioner to 
care for the children. In effect, in terms of planning, respondent is essentially a single parent 
since she cannot rely on petitioner's availability for any given time period. 
11. During the time that petitioner was seeking a teaching certificate, she completed 
22 credit hours and 40 hours of in-classroom teaching and observation with a GPA of almost 4.0. 
During the summer of 2005, the children were out of school and petitioner had six weeks training 
out-of-town and unpredictable flight schedules. Thus, respondent was unable to attend classes in 
the summer of 2005 because of her responsibilities to care for the children. 
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12. The parties' older son, Dane, has Asperger's Disorder. Asperger's Disorder is a 
developmental disorder related to autism. This disorder requires extra attention on the part of 
both of his parents, but because respondent is the primary caregiver, most of the burden of caring 
for Dane and meeting his special needs falls on her. In 2005, Dane was having difficulties in 
school and respondent was required to give a great deal of attention to his school work and 
general welfare. Petitioner and respondent do not communicate well about their children and 
particularly with respect to Dane's special needs. From respondent's perspective, petitioner is 
constantly undermining her efforts to meet Dane's needs. For example, petitioner refuses to 
cooperate in obtaining evaluations for Dane and has even said that the decline in Dane's grades 
was respondent's fault. 
13. Dane's relationship with petitioner has deteriorated so much that Dane does not 
like to spend time with him. Respondent receives calls and text messages from both children 
when they are with petitioner asking to come home earlier than scheduled. 
14. Respondent hopes to be able to make approximately $37,000 to $42,000 per year 
in the graphic design field. She also hopes to obtain employment with Redcastle Resources, Inc., 
which is operated by a friend of respondent's. 
15. At the present time, however, respondent is not employed. She has found a 
temporary internship for the purposes of developing her professional qualifications. She 
estimates that she will not obtain full-time employment at Redcastle Resources or elsewhere until 
early 2008. At present, the only jobs available would pay her approximately $10 per hour. 
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16. Respondent has diligently pursued her education. Petitioner claims that she has 
not used all the extra alimony paid to her for educational costs, but does not take into account the 
fact that she has transportation, food and other costs related to education that are not directly 
attributable to tuition and books. 
17. Alimony. The court originally awarded respondent alimony of $4,500 per month 
during the time she attended college and $3,000 per month during the time that she did not attend 
school. The court's original alimony award decreases to $2,000 per month in January of 2007. 
18. Respondent testified that her current monthly expenses are $6,133.86. She 
currently has little income, except a few hundred dollars from occasional photography jobs and 
an internship. 
19. The court finds that petitioner's income has been reduced by approximately 15% 
since the entry of the decree of divorce. This does not constitute a substantial and material 
change in circumstances sufficient to justify modification alimony provisions of the divorce 
decree. 
20. Petitioner's income will increase again in January of 2007, at the same time that 
the alimony award decreases to $2,000 per month. The $2,000 per month award was predicated 
on the assumption that respondent would become employed. 
21. At the time of the divorce, the court found that petitioner's reasonable monthly 
expenses were $3,800. Thus, although petitioner claims that he has spent more than half of his 
net income for alimony and child support, he has had ample funds to meet his needs. 
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22. Child Support. The court originally ordered petitioner to pay child support of 
$1,400 per month. The court found, based on petitioner's stipulation, that child support should 
be calculated using a sole custody child support worksheet. The court found that that stipulation 
"evidences petitioner's trust and sincere concern for his children" and was a factor in the court 
awarding joint physical custody of the children to the parties. (Original Findings of Fact, no. 42) 
23. Petitioner now wishes to use a joint physical custody worksheet to calculate child 
support. Again, this would be a more difficult task because petitioner's time with the children 
varies from month to month. Given the fact that petitioner's income exceeds the guideline 
amount of $10,000 per month, and that the original joint custody arrangement was predicated at 
least in part on petitioner's "trust and sincere concern for the children," the court finds that a joint 
physical custody worksheet should not be used to calculate child support. 
24. Moreover, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2(9)(a) provides that for purposes of 
modifying child support pursuant to a petition for modification, there must be a substantial 
change in circumstances. Under Section (9)(b), a substantial change includes: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and 
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(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the 
support of others. 
In this case, none of the conditions set forth in Section (9)(b) are present and therefore the court 
will not modify child support. 
25. Attorneys' Fees. Respondent is in need of assistance with payment of her 
attorneys' fees and petitioner has the ability to assist her. At the conclusion of trial in this matter, 
respondent will have incurred attorneys' fees of approximately $14,267.97. Petitioner should be 
ordered to pay that amount to respondent to assist her with payment of her attorneys' fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court makes the following conclusions of 
law: 
1. Because there has not been a substantial and material change in circumstances, 
petitioner's petition to modify the decree of divorce should be denied. 
2. The provisions of the decree of divorce should remain in full force and effect. 
DATED this day of , 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE BRUCE C. LUBECK 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to 
the following, postage prepaid, this \V_ day of July, 2006: 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Clyde Snow Sessions and Swensen 
201 South Main, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
521-6280 
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KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
Attorneys for Respondent 
136 East South Temple 
Twenty-First Floor 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERIC RICHARD ALBAN, 
Petitioner, RESPONDENT'S WITNESS AND 
) EXHIBIT LIST 
vs. 
) Civil No. 034500023 
JENNIFER ALBAN nka JENNIFER 
A T TQnxT \ Judge Brace C. Lubeck 
Respondent. 
Respondent intends to call the following witnesses at the trial of this matter: 
1. Jennifer Alison. 
2. Eric Alban. 
3. Ellen Maycock (as to attorneys' fees). 
Respondent reserves the right to call rebuttal witnesses. 
Respondent intends to introduce the following exhibits: 
1. Eric Alban's 2006 paycheck stubs. 
2. Monthly expenses for Jennifer Alison. 
3. 2005 tax return for Jennifer Alison. 
4. 2005 tax return for Eric Alban. 
5. Educational expense summary of Jennifer Alison. 
6. Hypothetical net income calculation of petitioner's income of $11,500 per month, 
respondent's income of $1,733 per month ($10/hour). 
7. Salt Lake Community College curriculum for Associate of Applied Science 
Degree in Visual Art and Design/Multimedia Emphasis. 
8. Education Completion Schedule. 
9. Jennifer Alison grades from University of Utah and Salt Lake Community 
College. 
10. Affidavit of Ellen Maycock of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
Respondent reserves the right to designate additional exhibits as rebuttal to exhibits 
designated by petitioner. 
DATED this / ) day of July, 2006. 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
136 East South Temple 
Twenty-First Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561 
ELLEN M^ytOCK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
RESPONDENT'S WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST to the following, postage prepaid, this 
\^%y of July, 2006: 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Clyde Snow Sessions and Swensen 
201 South Main, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
521-6280 
Vuk± 
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MONTHLY EXPENSES FOR JENNY ALISON 
Mortgage payments 
Real property tax 
Real property insurance 
Maintenance (including HOA dues) 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities: 
Natural gas 
Water 
Sewer 
Electricity 
Cable television 
Telephone 
Compuserve/internet 
Cellular telephone (Jenny and boys) 
Clothing (Jenny) 
Clothing (boys) 
Medical expenses (boys) 
Medical expense (Jenny) 
Dental expense (Jenny) 
Medical premium (Jenny) 
School fees for boys 
Activities for boys 
Postage 
Entertainment 
Gifts 
Donations 
Subscriptions/newspaper 
Incidentals (haircuts, vitamins, etc.) 
Photographs/developing 
Auto expense (maintenance) 
Auto insurance 
Auto expense (fuel) 
Taxes and accounting 
Pets/veterinary 
Cash 
School (tuition for 3 terms $3,000; supplies/books for 3 terms) 
Other expenses (specify): legal fees 
Dr. Denise Goldsmith's fees 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES 
$1,074.18 
included 
included 
$246.58 
$710.69 
$76.38 
$61.00 
$23.12 
$45.25 
$55.00 
$34.00 
$22.00 
$128.00 
$85.00 
$113.00 
$160.00 
$75.24 
$47.00 
$206.06 
$35.00 
$138.00 
$5.95 
$90.73 
$177.11 
$50.00 
$5.80 
$138.70 
$44.33 
$114.00 
$70.00 
$200.00 
$447.00 
$12.79 
$121.00 
S425.00 
$750.95 
$145.00 
$6,133.86 
JENNY ALISON SCHOOL EXPENSES 
College Tuition and Fees 
Spring-sefflestet.2004 -JJjwefsrty-eHJtah-— $-4^0^8,90-
Summer semester 2004 - University of Utah $ 1 158 90 
Fall semester 2004 - University of Utah $ 1,519 54 
Spring semester 2005 - University of Utah $ 1,068 90 
Fall semester 2005 - Salt Lake Community College $ 1,157 50 
Spring semester 2006 - Salt Lake Community College $ 1,889 50 
TOTAL 
Gasoline/Travel/Food Expenses 
3/10/2004 U of U internet payment 
8/6/2005 Tesoro 
8/15/2005 Albertson's Fuel 
8/28/2005 Blue Roof Market 
8/29/2005 7-Eleven 
8/30/2005 Smith's 
9/2/2005 7-Eleven 
9/17/2005 Blue Roof Market 
9/21/2005 Smith's 
9/27/2005 Albertson's Fuel 
10/1/2005 Blue Roof Market 
10/3/2005 Smith's 
10/5/2005 Chevron 
10/12/2005 Conoco 
10/14/2005 Chevron 
10/24/2005 Blue Roof Market 
10/25/2005 Maverick 
10/31/2005 Tesoro 
11/17/2005 Maverik 
11/21/2005 7-Eleven 
11/28/2005 7-Eieven 
12/1/2005 Maverik 
12/4/2005 Blue Roof Market 
12/24/2005 Blue Roof Market 
1/3/2006 Chevron 
1/5/2006 Brickyard 66 
1/11/2006 McDonald's 
1/12/2006 Smith's 
1/182006 Blue Roof Market 
1/19/2006 7-Eleven 
1 '24/2006 Blue Roof Market 
1/26/2006 Blue Roof Market 
TOTAL $ 858.73 
School Supplies 
1/24/2004 Staples S 10 82 
1/10/2004 University Bookstore $ 228 58 
1/11/2004 Barnes & Noble $ 95 94 
3/12/2004 MTU Cashier's Office $ 10 75 
4/26/2004 U of U Dept Parking $ 35 00 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
7,883.24 
36 00 
40 02 
39 28 
11 11 
41 54 
22 09 
28 70 
6 37 
38 38 
26 80 
12 35 
42 61 
30 45 
40 91 
26 65 
5 04 
43 91 
42 24 
28 13 
2913 
34 16 
3145 
8 02 
37 36 
12 34 
37 42 
4 99 
34 01 
1861 
28 85 
9 80 
10 01 
4/29/2004 U of U We payment 
4/29/2004 Michigan State University (transcript) 
5/11/2004 Student Health Services (MMR) 
8/1/2004 Staples 
8/12/2004 Commuter Services (Parking at U of 
8/18/2004 University Bookstore 
8/27/2004 University Bookstore 
8/29/2004 U of U - Matriculation Fee 
9/24/2004 University Bookstore 
10/11/2004 Staples 
8/9/2005 SLCC Bookstore 
8/12/2005 Staples 
8/24/2005 Utrecht art supplies 
8/30/2005 Utrecht art supplies 
9/2/2005 SLCC Bookstore 
9/9/2005 Reuel's Photo 
9/25/2005 Staples 
9/28/2005 SLCC Courtesy Desk 
11/4/2005 Utrecht art supplies 
11/17/2005 Staples 
1/9/2006 SLCC Bookstore 
1/9/2006 Utrecht art supplies 
1/10/2006 Utrecht art supplies 
1/11/2006 Walmart 
1/12/2006 SLCC Bookstore 
1/14/2006 Staples 
1/16/2006 Staples 
1/18/2006 SLCC Bookstore 
1/20/2006 Utrecht art supplies 
1/20/2006 Utrecht art supplies 
1/30/2006 Walmart 
TOTAL 
GRAND TOTAL 
Alban v. Alison 
Civii No. 034500023 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
330.46 
5.00 
32.00 
49.94 
120.00 
250.67 
75.68 
70.00 
37.81 
95.67 
155.80 
5.91 
56.02 
15.09 
11.27 
48.55 
30.82 
7.40 
19.04 
11.58 
72.91 
134.96 
159.31 
20.92 
49.60 
9.22 
34.19 
6.23 
12.46 
22.97 
6.75 
2,339.32 
$11,081.29 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERIC RICHARD ALBAN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JENNIFER ALBAN, nka JENNIFER 
ALISON, 
Respondent. 
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 034500023 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
Petitioner Eric R. Alban submits the following proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. The parties were married on December 22, 1986. 
2. The trial of this action was conducted on January 22, 
2004. On January 27, 2004, the Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision. 
3. Respondent Jennifer Blumbergs Alison Alban filed a 
post-trial motion claiming the parties were incapable of 
effectuating joint legal and physical custody even though the 
parties had stipulated to such at the time of trial. On March 
24, 20C4, the Court entered a Ruling and Order denying 
Respondent's motion stating that "the court does not believe the 
parties are incapable of making joint decisions, [rather] the 
court believes the parties simply do not currently make joint 
decision well." 
4. On April 23, 2004, the Court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (the wFindings") and also a Decree 
of Divorce (the "Decree") , A courtesy copy of the Findings and 
Decree are included as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively. 
5. On December 8, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce (the "Petition"). In the Petition, 
Petitioner requested that the amount of child support and 
alimony be modified based on a 32.5% decrease in Petitioner's 
base pay and substantial reductions in other elements of 
Petitioner's compensation and benefits. Based on the changes to 
his work schedule, Petitioner also requested that the schedule 
of his parent-time be modified. 
6. On January 6, 2 005, Respondent filed an answer to the 
Petition and also a Counterpetition. The Counterpetition 
requested that the joint legal and physical custody arrangement 
be terminated and that Respondent be awarded sole legal custody 
and primary physical custody. 
7. On August 19, 2005, Petitioner filed a Verified Motion 
for Temporary Relief. Based on a stipulation of the parties, 
Dr. Denise Goldsmith was appointed as the parenting coordinator 
and all ether issues were reserved. Dr. Goldsmith continues to 
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assist the parties in resolving disputes regarding scheduling 
parent-time and child-related issues. The issues of custody and 
parent-time are reserved and not before the Court in this trial. 
8. Trial dates were scheduled for March and May 2006 but 
were stricken because Petitioner's employment contract was re-
negotiated for a third time effective June 1, 2006. 
THE FINDINGS AND DECREE AND THE STATUS OF THE PARTIES AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL 
9. Pursuant to paragraphs 3 through 11 of the Decree, the 
parties were awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of 
their two minor children with Petitioner having parent-time 
consisting of eight overnights each four week period during the 
time the children are in school, one half of the summer vacation 
period, and statutory holiday parent-time. 
10. Petitioner's annual overnight parent-time is 
calculated as follows: 
80 School year of 40 weeks with eight 
overnigttts each four weeks 
42 Summer of 12 weeks equally dividing the time 
1_0 Average holiday overnight parent-time 
132 Total 
11. In paragraph 56 of the Findings, the Court found that 
Petitioner had gross monthly income of $13,339.00 and net 
disposable income of $9,868,00 from his employment in 2003 as a 
pilot for Delta Air Lines. In paragraph 57 of the Findings, the 
Court found that Petitioner had reasonable monthly living 
expenses of $3,800.00. 
12. In paragraphs 37 through 41 of the Findings, the Court 
found that Respondent has a bachelor's degree, had worked and 
earned various amounts, but that it was in Respondent's and the 
children's long-term best interests to permit Respondent to 
obtain her teaching certificate so that Respondent and the 
children were on the same daily schedule and so that Respondent 
would not have to work during the summer or during other school 
breaks. In paragraph 4 0 of the Findings, the Court found that 
Respondent could earn approximately $30,000 per year from an 
entry level teaching position. Respondent has now abandoned 
that plan notwithstanding the fact that such plan is in the 
children's best interest. In paragraph 58 of the Findings, the 
Court found that Respondent had reasonable monthly living 
expenses of $4,500.00 which included amounts for tuition for 
college and some allowance for taxes on alimony. 
13. Pursuant to paragraph 42 of the Findings, based on 
monthly incomes of $13,339.00 and $0.00 for Petitioner and 
Respondent, respectively, Respondent was awarded child support 
in the amount of $1,40 0.00 per month commencing February 2004, 
as set forth in paragraph 20 of the Decree. Child support was 
calculated at the time of trial using a sole custody child 
support obligation worksheet based en Petitioner's voluntary 
agreement to use such even though a joint custody child support 
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obligation worksheet could have been used. Paragraph 20 of the 
Decree provides that w[b]eginning in 2007, the child support 
shall be calculated on the gross monthly incomes of the parties 
using whatever worksheet is agreed to or is proper according co 
statute." 
14. Pursuant to paragraph 32 of the Decree, commencing 
February 2004 through December 2006, Respondent was awarded 
alimony in the amount of $4,500.00 per month during the period 
of time she was attending school to obtain her teaching 
certificate. In the event Respondent did not attend school 
during that time period, alimony was to be reduced to $3,000.00 
per month. Commencing January 2007, alimony was to be reduced 
to the amount of $2,000.00 per month to terminate on the 
statutory events. 
15. Pursuant to paragraph 33 of the Decree, Petitioner 
reserved the right to petition the Court to modify the amounts 
of child support and alimony "if future contracts between Delta 
Air Lines and the pilot's union result in a substantial change 
in Petitioner's circumstances." 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN PETITIONER'S CIRCUMSTANCES 
16. There has been a substantial change in Petitioner's 
circumstances described as follows. 
A. Effective Decerrber 1, 2004, the Delta Air Lines 
pilot's union voted in favor of a new contract which 
reduced their salary by 32.5% and also reduced other 
D 
benefits as a concession so as to assist Delta Air Lines 
from having to file for bankruptcy. This new contract is 
commonly referred to as Letter of Agreement #4 6. See 
Exhibit 3. 
B. As of January 2005, Petitioner was awarded a 
promotion to the rank of captain as compared to the rank of 
first officer which he held at the time of trial. 
Petitioner completed his training for the new position 
during the spring and early summer of 2005. 
C. Notwithstanding attempts to stave off bankruptcy, 
Delta Air Lines filed for bankruptcy protection on 
September 14, 2005. 
D. Effective December 15, 2005, the Delta Air Lines 
pilot's union voted a second time in favor of a new 
contract which reduced their salary by an additional 14% 
and also reduced other benefits. This reduction is 
commonly referred to as Letter of Agreement #50. See 
Exhibit 4. 
E. Effective June 1, 2006, the Delta Air Lines 
pilot's union voted a third time in favor of a new contract 
which continued the 14% salary reduction that was effective 
December 15, 2005, but reduced other compensation and 
benefits of the Delta pilots. This reduction is commonly 
referred to as Letter of Agreement #51. See Exhibit 5. 
Under the terms of Letcer of Agreement #51, effective June 
6 
1, 2006, Petitioner's pay will continue at the hourly 
flight rate that went into effect December 15, 2005. 
Effective January 1, 2007, Petitioner's pay will increase 
1.5%. 
PETITIONER'S INCOME and OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES 
17. As described in Exhibits 6 through 10, Petitioner had 
average monthly W-2 box 1 income in the following amounts for 
the years 2003 through 2006 (with 2006 income being annualized 
based on actual income through June 30, 2006): 
2003 $13,339 
2004 $14,837 
2005 $10,931 
2006 $11,183 
18. As described in Exhibits 6 through 10, if Petitioner's 
contributions to his 401 (k) account are taken into 
consideration, Petitioner had average monthly W-2 box 5 income 
m the following amounts for the years 2003 through 2006 (with 
2006 income being annualized based on actual income through June 
30, 2006) : 
2003 $13,515 
2004 $15,825 
2005 $12,098 
2006 $11,183 
19. Petitioner's income for the last six months (January 
through June 2006) is indicative of what his future income will 
be and is described as follows. See Exhibit 10 which is 
Petitioner's June 30, 2006 payroll stub. 
$11,183 Average monthly taxable wages 
-2,227 Deductions for taxes 
317 Deductions for union dues and insurance 
$ 8,639 Net take home pay 
20. Petitioner's hourly flight rates over the last several 
years are as follows. See Exhibit 11. 
$178.00 At the time the Decree was entered, 
Petitioner was earning $178.00 per flight 
hour as a first officer. 
$182.72 Just before the first pay reduction in 
December 2004, Petitioner was earning 
$182.72 per flight hour. 
$123.00 The first pay reduction in December 2004 
reduced Petitioner's pay to $123.00 per 
flight hour as a first officer. 
$162.00 After Petitioner started to receive pay as a 
captain and because of the first pay 
reduction, Petitioner's initial pay as a 
captain was $162.00 per flight hour. 
$141.00 The 14% pay reduction that became effective 
December 15, 2005, reduced Petitioner's pay 
to $141.00 per flight hour. 
$141.00 The $141.00 per flight hour pay rate 
continues under the contract that becarr.e 
effective June 1, 2006. 
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21. The average annual flight hours that Petitioner has 
had for the last several years are as fellows: 
2003 71:50 hours per month 
2004 80:21 hours per month 
2005 79:54 hours per month 
2006 (6 months) 77:22 hours per month 
See Exhibit 12. Petitioner is now working approximately 10% 
more than he did at the time of the divorce although he is 
earning less. 
22. In addition to the base pay reduction, the Letters of 
Agreement result in changes to numerous other benefits 
Petitioner had at the time of the divorce as compared to the 
present such as: (i) Petitioner will have to pay a portion of 
the premiums for medical and dental insurance; (ii) Petitioner 
will have a larger deductible and have to pay a larger 
percentage of the medical and dental costs; and (iii) the per 
diem, night pay, overtime, and vacation pay rates are all 
reduced. 
23. At the time of the divorce, Petitioner was a first 
officer with substantial seniority to bid his flight schedule. 
At the present time, Petitioner is a captain with little 
seniority to bid his flight schedule. In addition, Delta Air 
Lines has implemented a new bidding software program which 
limits Petitioner's input into the number of hours he can bid. 
24. As described in Exhibit 13, Petitioner has paid an 
inordinate percentage cf his disposable income to Respondent in 
the form of child support, alimony and educational alimony. As 
described in Exhibit 13, in certain months the percentage has 
been as high as 76% of his disposable income and has averaged 
56.61% over the 26 months from May 2004 to June 2006. 
RESPONDENT'S INCOME and OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES 
25. For the year 2004, Respondent reported $2,010 of wage 
income, $280 of interest income, and $46,500 of alimony income. 
Respondent also reported a deduction in the amount of $2,597 for 
tuition and fees. See Exhibit 14. 
26. For the year 2005, Respondent reported no wages, $724 
of interest income, $50,250 of alimony income, net business 
income of $418 (based on $1,800 of revenue and $1,382 of 
business deductions). Respondent also reported a deduction in 
the amount of $4,000 for an IRA and $3,357 for tuition and fees. 
See Exhibit 15. 
27. Pursuant to documents produced by Respondent, 
Respondent has apparently earned approximately $1,400 during 
2006 doing freelance photography work during April and May. 
Assuming some reasonable amount for business expenses of 
approximately $100.00 per month, Respondent is averaging $600 
per month in income ($1,400 - $200 » $1,200 -r 2 = 5600 per 
month). See Exhibit 16. 
28. At the time of trial, Respondent testified that she 
believed that her besc career path was as a teacher. The Court 
so found in paragraphs 3 9 and 4 0 of the Findings. 
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29. Subsequently, Respondent has changed her mind 
regarding her career path. In her affidavit dated October 4, 
2005, Respondent indicated as follows: 
However, after some experience in the 
education field, I began to realize that the 
program did not suit me and that my income 
would not be adequate when I completed the 
program and more importantly, that it would 
have taken at least 4 years to finish the 
program. Accordingly, I have changed to a 
Graphic Arts program. I believe that I will 
immediately obtain full-time employment at a 
higher income upon completion of that 
program. (See Exhibit "A") It is only a 2-
year program at the Salt Lake Community 
College. I started classes this fall. 
See Exhibit 17. 
30. Exhibit A to Respondent's affidavit is a letter to 
Respondent from Paul Ishikawa, Jr., the vice president of 
RedCastle Resources, Inc., indicating the potential of 
Respondent's employment with RedCastle after Respondent 
completes certain training resulting in income between $37,000 
and $42,000 per year. The midpoint is $39,500 or $3,292 per 
month. 
31. Respondent represents that she is not currently 
working for RedCastle although she has recently requested 
Petitioner to arrange his schedule so as to allow Respondent the 
ability to work two days per week. Respondent also represents 
that she is receiving no financial aid for her schooling. 
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Cc; Jenny 
6-7-e Medical Expenses Log 
I gave Jenny tins log, date: 6-7-6, and all EOB's as of today on file w»th UHC: 
EOBs for year - thus far: 
Dillon 
A) 2-7-6 
B) 3-7-6 
C) 3-7-6 
D) 3-17-6 
E) 3-17-6 
F) 3-17-6 
G) 4-26-6 
H) 5-10-6 
Dillon 
Patient Resp 
146.13 
10.02 
41 
64.24 
10.02 
23 
25 
20 
Pane Patient Resp 
I) 4/7 -4/21 70 
J) 4-27-6 20 
K) 5-10-6 41 (-20 co-pay) = $21 
L) 5-10-6 10.02 
A) 2/7/6; L Anderson, $146.13. EOB, I paid 5-18-6, Visa, received receipt copied 6-6-0, DONE 
B) 3,7/6, LabCorp, $10.02, EOB, biti pd/Jenny? await receipt., CC (biit mailed to Jenny), Labcorp; 
8-044-8121, 
C) 3/7/6; L Webster, $41.00, EOB, Wasatch Pediatrics staled $20 co-pay pd. at time of svc. leaving 
$21 owAd, new statement received, I paid this S21 along with item K) $21, and F) S3. $45 totai paid 
6-7-6 via Am Ex, awaiting receipttrom Ten. 
D) 3/17/6; LabCorp, $64.24, EOB, (bill to Jenny); I changed address to me as I was the responsible 
party and Jenny was overdue. I paid bill with bill below, $74.26 ($04.24 + 10.02) totai, see Visa 
receipt, copied 6-6-6. DONE 
E) 3/1 //6; LabCorp, $10.02. EOB, bill originally to Jenny; I changed address to me as ! was the 
responsible party and Jenny was overdue. I paid bill with biif above, $74.26 ($04.24
 r 10.02; total. 
Visa, copied receipt, DONE 
F) 3/17/6; L. ferry, $23, EOB, Wasatch Pediatrics stated $20 co-pay pd. at time of svd, leaving G3 
owed, received new statement, I paid this S3 along with item C) $21, and K) $21. $45 totai paid 6-7-6 
via Am Ex, awaiting rece/pf from Ten. 
G) 4/27/6, Anderson $25 no bill yet. Paid $20 co-pay at visit, Am Ex, emailed receipt to Jen same 
day. I may get bill for difference of $5 for emergency billing co-pay vs wlw I paid A waiting maybe. 
H) 5/10 6, Webster, $20, no blii yet. 
Qane 
I) 4,7-21/6; Pat Sanger. $70 (Jenny & I v'sits), FOB, I pd. my visits (4-19, 5-17), DONE 
J) 4,27'0 I . Webster, S20, bill, 0 balance as of 5-30-6 invoice, may change/watch next invoice 
K) o/10;6- L. Webster, $41- $20 co-pay pd = $21, Ten stated 6-7-6-phone that biti came in for $21, i 
paid this $21 along with item C) $21, and F) $3. $45 totai paid 6-7-6 via Am Ex. arsaitma receipt 
from Ten 
I ) 5/10/0; L. Webster, $10 02, bill pd. 6-6-6, call back to get 0 balance statement or use CC receipt 
My notes, Pat Sanger visits; $25 individual co-pay, S10 co-pay family. Pat gets paid $80 total tor 
ii Kiivicjuai session and $60 foi family session - including co-pay 
• l; 
Medical Bi'is Update (or 200$. 3-15-6; this fir.ah.zes 2005 
f wrote in my last lo:jT dated 1-25-6, that 
-1 was awaiting word on the 10-25-5 immunizations tor both boys The claim was resubmitted and we owe 
$16.52 tor eacn boy f wili C30 Wasatch Pediatrics and pay this b.ll 
- That completes Dnlon 
- there was a 7-1B-5 CX)S for Dane from Dr Flick for S800 and the EOB was processed with $0 patient 
responsibility Closed 
- A copy of the bill for 12/5/5 DOS for Dane Is enclosed. $115 31 was paid 3/6/6 with the iterrized cairns 
incnatoo on the bill Your half JS $57 65 
- A copy of the dentist bid ! paid $48 on 3-16-6 is enclosed Your half is $24 
- This completes 2C05 for both boys 
- You owe me $155 07 from the 1-25-6 log 
plus half of $115.31 or $57 85 
plus half of $46 C $24 frcrn the dental bill 
Total above = $236 72,1 await your reimbursement 
Just as a reminder, the decree states to provide written verification to the other party wthm 30 days (I did this) 
andi reimbursement shaJ be made within 15 days of the wntten verification being presented i have presented 
the other bills to you a long time ago indicating a request for reimbursement, t have not received this 
As a suggestion/request, I request that which ever parent take the kid(s) Into a medical/dental facility, that the 
bill be mailed to tr*jr parent Each parent can subm.t ifa bus copy to the other parent. It is unreasonable for me 
to pay all bills do all billing and copying and not receive any reimbursement from you 
rr-ottf: enc alban <e33®flightiine.com> 
Subject: Re: Medtca! bill 
D-.itc: February 8; 2006 8:46:49 AM MSI 
To: Jigster71 ©cs-corn 
Co: ere alban <e33®flightline.com> 
Jenny, 
i stibrriitted a I EOBs to you wth the past 3 detailed .'ogs. Wnat are your intentions to pay the amount due9 i await your 
reply. E 
On Jan 7, 2006, at 1.32 PM, Jigster71 ©cs.corri wrote: 
I trie, 
I i v/ould like any EOS forms that you nave. I ha/e a few RX receipts m\6 will get them to you a&ap. 
Ved ~a! Biiis Update fo' 200s 1 -2^-6 
The EOBs <JH& unavailable 2 weeks ago onli. « doe to upgrading the computer syslen at Uf IC, called aud 
ordurei EOBs for the year ar d ! received them n the naii today 1 25-6 
I reviewed my previous log<? of dates 6-1-5, 9-1-5, and 10 ""9-5 After finai<zmg 9-1 o Jonnvowed me !>16^ if 
No charge WdS made to tne 10-19-5 log as J paid $40 with chock #32(J6 for items in tais lug only, t e the 
balance of $165 07 »s s*ill owed to me from the prevtoLS log - 9/1/5 
Other charges after ubove fogs as follows 
1 $10 1 paid 7-19 5, Paxil I gave copy to Jenny 9-2-5 so not included previously Jenny owes me $3 now 
$V0 07owrcltoiT*e 
? $10 I pdia 8*31-5, Paxil submitted copy Jenny owes me $5, now $175 07 owed to me 
3 (ewe tewy $?B for the bills she stbrmHed to me last week 
"S10 co-pay 10-P9 5, Pa*!' 
- S20 co-pay 12-5-5 Wasatch Pediatrics 
- % f 0 co-pay 12-5-5 Inhaler Albuterol 
- $10 co-pay 1-15-6, Paxil 
$150 0/ now owed to me 
4 $10 I paKj 12-23-5, Paxil. Jenny owes me $5 I emailed her the receipt 12-23-5, gave her another copy here 
$155 07 now owod to me 
On the log dated S-1-5, i listed EOBs through 6-7-5 Subsequent EOBs are 
- M8-5 Dane Dr Flick, S800 amount charged, I am uncertain as to the oil!, services rendered and coverage 
There ib a code 17 on the E08 which states that prior notification was required ard not received * have 
received no bill for this service I called UHC and tl»e rep stated that thlb bill is in referer^e to a psychotherapy 
of ice visit that I am unaware ot with Or Flick The rep added that the b»ll shoukl be sent to United Behavioral 
Hr al*n ard not UHC Tnts needs tc be resuom'tted by Jenny (or the oft ce personnel for Or Fhcfc) for dosure on 
ti us bill 
-10-25-5 Dane, Immunizations EOB states thit the patient pays 16 52 When I spoke with the UHC rep 
(Todd) on 1-26-6 m said tnat immunizat:ons are of no cost to i*> He re-submftted the case to be of no change 
'"odd stated that the matter will be resolved within 30 days It is possible that Tcdd did not know what 
immunization was administered - the flu shot We may have to pay as this is not a routine immuntz - awaiting 
<epty from UHC I spoke w*th Wasatch Pe3>atncs and Lor: stated to not pay on th«e prefer* bills I have until the 
-10 ^6-6 Di^on Immunizations, Patent pays 16 52r> - awaiting Same as above with Dane's explanation 
-11-16-5 Dillon, Dr Tery Patient pays $20 tnis S20 co-pay ,v_,$ paid at time of serv.ee UHC pa.d tn^ 
r-Tiainder ano no bill ur charges ex^t to- us - Closed 
-12-5-5, Dare, CH Lab Svcs Patient pays 10 02, Jenny submitted a M to me for tne §20 co-pay EOB states 
:o py} o< * i r 02 Awating bn* for $10 0? 
J Mo log w il bring us up-to-date with the Gxcection ol tne »waiting ^ems mentior- d above 
f'iAT- enc alban <e33@fightline com> 
SU'QILCI: Re: Medical bill 
Oa :** January 5, 2006 8 58 58 AM MST 
r o : Jigster71@csccro 
C •; enc alban <e33@flightl na com> 
Jenny, 
we hcwe ha?- a iot o* problems in the past with you saving receipts urtii you accurnu ate and then thure h^s ceei conflicts 
with a laundry list of oilJs and your protest to rry detailed oills log The time that transpires with accumulating bills acd tirrw-i 
and contact to responding to b;ll(s) in a small time-f'ame. I ask aga n to simpiy the process that we comply with the decree 
ar;d the guaehnes of dates to prevent die past problerrx Yea have my copied bills and I wiii forward ycu a ncn-email copy 
for your r ecoras. I await the payment E 
On Jan 2, 2CC6, at 1 07 PM Jigster71 @cs.com wrote: 
I I have sovsral to send you , so i will respond to yours when I give you my receipts. Plen^e send me a hardcopy as your scan is too large *o print. 
ItenrM Bills 10-19-5 
Jenny, cooking over tho madical receipts that you s^nt me, my reply is 
Yojrrutoof 
550 
7o0 
PS 00 
- $08? 50, you owd me (written by you) 
As for the first item, $550 Or Smoot bill I have discussed this with you via email S sort you an email 9-9-5 
reqardinq Or Snroo" and biWirtq If you have a ry questions o^ *r» s em j \ let me kfx *v ! ner vutec tha* J wi1 pa/ 
* /2 u! wnat I wou.d have p-ud vvlh using our insurance plan with pncr rot ice in the email mentioned atove, 
mere aio ^odes, dates, etc tfiat must be sunt (i wtl< forward info gathered by you and given to me; to the 
insurance company for reimbursement - of which I will pay half 
Your reply to my email was 
Cue, 
Tne $30 is f*om 2U.4 F-anrj a depos t to noid Dare s v ^ t J ^ ^a^p at tne U *hch have a ready given ycu <s coo/of 
T»- & $400 bill was .rcluded in th* Ust batch of bill& V at I gave to /ou fot 2005 """Here is a $400 charge for your ha f of toe 
fcjT4mer camp I have already pasd my half This & on a U o<" J billing tUtement The S15 ts a $3 residua! from 3 visits to Or 
Lamhart by Dare that reeds to be split t wt» send you these aga r If I reed to 
rracme S^cot wa& 'ecorr r ended to me became sh* Is one of th»* bost One of :ho major reasons toa* J hao Dane tested is 
because you refused to sign for permss on to be evaluated fo" a 504 
11 eve paid thin bill in full already I did not think you would agree to pay for this Jpnny anyways 
As for the second item, $7 50 for tr<e U ot U $15 bill, I will pay this 
For the 3'd item, $25, half of $50 below 
S20 copay, 6-6-5; I will pay $10 
$20 copay. 6-7-5; I will pay $10 
$10 Rx, 8-7-5, i wih pay $5 
Other copies included m envelope 
- $'5 for Rx 8-19-5,! ml pay S7 50 for this bill. 
- $ too paid by me (for surnmr camp) 
i received a copy of check 721 for $50 There is no note for this item and it s over i l/2yrs oki i have no idea 
wnat this is and > J^ ave sent numerous detailed logs shorting alt costs - owed and paid and the respone»ole 
party i consider this copy of tne cheek rneaninqieKs unless jou can dispute my previous d *laiu*d IGQS witn 
proof that I owe half of this, I may have accounted tor this ana you can show me otherwise sinco it is so oid 
i wtii review my previous tog of wnere we stana win my oi Is and your Dilis 
I will write back wrwn I have a total tally In IU& mean \ me, i will pay $40 for the medical receipts of 6-6-7. 6 
/•5 3-7-5, dr\ti 8-10-5, as weil as half of the $15 U of U Dill for 3 underpaid co-pays $40 with check # 
I j believe "hat i could easily have D(. Remington stats that inis treatment Is <n the best interact of Dane before or aMer 
I J treatment. 
I j If there are any recommendations from Dr. Lsinhart or any other person associated with the future treatment of our 
J j children, I &Gk that you notify me of this to pursue a po^iibie input from me. 
j j Paragraph 62 of the Decree states 'Trie parties snail consult witn each otner before making zny changes in insurance 
j { or other matters affecting eirher pany and the children." 
J j My interpretation is that mis was ignored .and I was blind-sided with a bill that could have been drama:lca!fy reduced. 
j t 1 am awaiting a reply from Tracine for the number of sessions that were involved in this evaluation. \ discussed this 
j j matter with Dean and ne advised me to pay 1/2 of ih-a charges that would be billed from an in-neiwork doctor. Dean 
I J i>tatoo for me to send him a copy of the correspondence and l will. He expects to hear from EHen regarding tnis matter. 
j j I have notified Tracine of this matter. I have an authorization number/code for future til ing services. I nave given this to 
j j Tracine. For all Ivtijrv sessions that you wii send me a o.i? for, the Showing 's needed for any claims (! have forwarded 
J I this info, also to Tracine): 
] I - a diagnosis code (OX) for each session 
- a 5-digit OPT code for each session 
- n e tax ID number included with the provider information. 
- the date for each session, extended or not 
- the place of visit for each session 
Again, we have choices tn the health plan and this was ignored - unnecessary - and we may have even been able to use 
Tractne anyway. After, I receive the number of billing sessions from Tracine, I will multiply that number by $25 and sha^e 
that tota? with you. i feel that my position is very reasonable and I wsi accept the Judge's ruling if the court dfsagrees with 
my position. In the meantime,! ask that you discuss with Tracine how best to settle with the bill she sent you - as you are 
the responsible party for this service. 
{ J I ask that ;n the future, I am m&de aware of any charges that will be before me - prior to any trcatrnenrs/serv«Cv?3 for the 
J J children that you have time ro give me. We both could save a lot of money with the little benefits we still have., and we 
j j should discuss matters with the children; as you often say pthat is co-parenting," E 
f m . \ one alban <e32&fiigh:hr e com> 
•b. ~c t Medical brll from Tractne 
TJ *' September 9, 2005 8 45.10 AM MDT 
T
' Jenry <Jigstfer7*» ^ c s com> 
(
.r\ eric aiban <e33^flightline com> 
Ji m y 
Th o ami f was written *vcli ov jr a we ^ k's t*me period ""here //as a ot o* ^format en for rr.e to gatner to complete this 
matter of concern 
i nave i rred.ca! plan
 fcv.m ber.wfits that cvn oe useo to h<- p pay for med«ca! services such as Dane's eva'uaticn yo J 
had v«Mh fiactne Smoor if ( was oohng m*c any treatment for Dune, I wojic pursue an m-netwerk provider to 
d'arnattca^y teddce o jr expenses I haa no Knowledge or nput chat you were doing tnis evaluation jntil after the 
evaluation was conducted. YOJ chose an out-cf-network psycnofoqist that cosrs nuch more than if an \n-net&cr< 
p ' ry id f was chc-ceji Nc prone call vas rrane fo the insurance company prior to any sen/ice fcr an authorisation 
coce you sent me a b?il foi services that we/e done out of network ana thus the maximum is $25 per sesston vs tho 
$"> 100 oi'l you want me to share 
i cahsd uHC iast weeK ardl they referred me to UEri for rrertai hearth ssues ^"\d coverage 
\ was told the foilow<rg 
If wu contacted UBH for finding a provider/psychologist that is m-netwerk, there is a zero deductible and a $25 fee per 
season 
If thcr.. wan not a provider who couid have acne the special assessment they woula hnd sorreore to co tne 
assessment under a spoaal-CdSe network ratw. and we wouid be o.l ed only 325/session 
ft we go to an Out-of-Network benefit, we get reimbursed $25/session only 
You are sending me a oi I for $550 of whicn I haa no input whatscevur. We could have possibly paid $'?5/sess.or cniy 
and st II have used Tracme if an agreement could t^a^e been reached with ner and JBH rf no other assessment 
D'yChc egis: wv. ^v3t<5acje *cr *ne NCH ?ve ha^e bene*its let use them v/neneve^ possible 
if too- Dane to some doctor - wAbout an emergency - tnat I feel i wart to have some tests or treatment w.th to pursue 
my interests v*»th Dane. v.»thout te! ing you about :r s. and submit a huge bill to you would yet pay this? Wcub you 
'-,v! that it A as necessary to do tus treatment without considering a healtn oe^efa tnat we f* u/e n th«c matter u 
dramatically lower the bill? Would you feel that if I 6\t some work mth Dane, that you wo jid /vant an input? 
/ou int.atoc rhs vo'K ,vtrout tt is medical da ros co^en-»ge/t>enef t l/we have and I *eei rt s 4&r for me fc cav //hat! 
would have if i was m Knowledge of ths matter i know vvnat the ducue states about sharing expenses but trere is 
nore to Ino statement r, ny opm on than you doing what you did a id charging me odnd-sidee for a b» I tnat couid have 
b~en dramatically lower if I had an >nput into th s matter I do be! eve that you would &an* fo know who are sor wou'd 
uu eva uat«3d with, ana ¥c cor&ce the ccst v/ith drfe'ent cpr on? we ha^j wrn my mecieej plans - espuc!cii,y w f* a! cl 
th^ encca s:at€mcn*s I g^t *rom ycu about co-parerting concerns, Th s ^-as net co-parernrg and urfa r I be! e/u I 
should nave an input and nctifcat on for matters of choosing doctors dentists pSyChCiOgsts and orhor mpora^t 
:i.?Db'Ah c* : t r CU.!J S S C S Defers? am - .^» tdi^vu y^ j \.v .JO 
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1 the teaching certificate program? 
2 I A I've had a lot of questions I've posed to Dean just 
3 about that in terms of the number of semesters. The first 
4 ; letter that we got from Jenny -
5 I Q Let me get to the answer of my question. 
6 I A Okay. 
7 ! Q You don't know. 
8 ' A I don't know. 
9 I Q Okay. Now you've testified that in April of 2005 
10 j you went into training for your captain's job, correct? 
11 I A In April 2005, yes. 
12 i Q And you were gone from home 25 days? 
13 A Correct. 
14 j Q So you didn't see the children during that time? 
15 j A No, I did not have a break. I was probably the 
16 i only guy in my class but I did not have a break tn come back 
! 
17 ! home. 
i 
18 ! Q And you're schedule for the summer of 2005 was 
I 
19 , pretty tricky; is that fair to say? 
20 ! A True. 
21 ! Q Were you able to spend half the summer with the 
i 
22 J children in the summer of 2005? 
! 
23 j A Yes. I remember counting up the days and I met 
1 
24 ,' half. 
! 
25 I Q Now do you have some control over the number of 
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hours that you fly? 
A Very little. 
Q Well, you testified -
A Currently. 
Q Okay. You testified that there's a bidding 
procedure. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And that pilots manipulate that to some extent to 
make as much money as they possibly can? 
A The very senior guys like I was saying in previous 
testimony the top two guys can bid reserve and play this 
particular game that's an idiosyncracy of the present 
contract. I'm not in that position. 
Q But you have some control over how many hours you 
work? 
A Very little, and I think it's important if you 
would allow me just to explain to the Court that in the past 
I could bid a certain number of hours and then there was open 
time where there are a lot of trips in open time. This new 
scheduling system maximizes flying so that we utilize less 
guys, benefits the company, we have less pilots where we fly 
and there's hardly any open time that is there now. And the 
top few guys will take that open time. Me not being the 
senior first officer like I was before I don't have available 
open time and most times when I look at open time there's 
was there and his dad was there. And Eric was on the phone, 
I was trying to move over to talk to him and he walked away. 
The long and the short of the story is Dane wanted to come 
home, I was standing in the middle of a basketball court 
trying to call this - a residence, there was a lost dog 
there, so I was standing on the phone trying to contact these 
people saying your dog is at the park, and I watch Eric's car 
back out and drive away. Dane was not next to me. Dane was 
nowhere to be seen. And a few minutes later Dane comes out 
down from the hill and appears. So I had called Eric and I 
said, "Why are you leaving Dane without telling me?" That 
was what transpired last night. 
Q Now we know that Mr. Alban can't predict his 
schedule ahead of a few days before the month begins, 
correct? 
A That's right. 
Q And that's still been the case? 
A Yes. 
Q And have there been times since the divorce decree 
was entered where it was worse than others, for example, last 
summer, the summer of 2 005? 
A Yes, we've been working on trying to have our 
scheduling situation get better, and I know there are 
situations where it cannot be helped because of his flight 
schedule. But when he was in training in May he had no idea 
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when the specific dates would be for training. When he 
finally went to training he has to have his two check rides 
and he doesn't know when the check rides will be, so we're 
kind of on hold because he's on call and then once he gets 
his check rides done they put him up for a schedule. And so 
for May of 2005 I couldn't register for classes because I had 
no idea where he would be for supporting me helping with the 
kids* And not only that, I had more than 25 days straight 
with the kids as a full-time mom. 
Q And when he's flying or when he's in training he's 
out of town? 
A He's gone. He's unavailable. 
Q So if something goes wrong with your life or the 
kids get sick, he's not available? 
A No, he's not. 
Q Do you agree that Dr. Goldsmith has been helpful in 
trying to resolve some of the scheduling issues? 
A She's been very helpful. It took a little while to 
get things situated at the very beginning. I had to spend a 
couple hours sitting down with her with our decree explaining 
how the days worked for Eric. He felt that we were trying to 
maximize that and as we are operating now it was as we 
originally should have been and it's become a lot easier. I 
think she's a necessity for us. 
Q And how has Dane been doing since 2004 as far as 
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household income in the place where they mainly spend their 
time that it would be a substantial hardship for them and 
their mother. 
I think the testimony is absolutely clear that Mr. 
Alban has made no effort whatsoever to resolve these issues 
on any basis. That's one of the reasons we're here today and 
that's why the attorney's fees are as high as they are. I 
don't think that the Court should countenance that. I think 
that if there is an attorney's fees award to be made, it 
should be in Ms. Alison's favor. 
Utah law I think is instructive on this point 
because when child support statutes were put together the 
court wanted to give some guidance to the courts - I mean the 
legislature wanted to give some guidance to the courts as 
what would be a substantial change. And they said a material 
change of 30 percent or more in the income of a parent. 
Well, since Mr. Alban doesn't have that and he only has a 15 
or 16 percent, we'd even go with a 15^ percent decrease in 
his income, which was the basis for the petition for 
modification was the big change that Delta decreased, not the 
fact that Ms. Alison has a tiny bit of income from freelance 
photography jobs and internships that she's doing as much for 
the fact that they enhance her resume and her future 
errpioyability as she is for the money. I dor/1 thmK the 
court - even the legislature had in mind that if you were 
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